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ARTICLES 
SEPARATE AND OBEDIENT: THE]UDICIAL 
QUALIFICATION MISSING FROM THE]OB 
DESCRIPTION 
''We must make certain that no judge is ever influenced in deciding a 
case by the threat of being turned out of office because the decision, while 
made in good faith, differs from the way those responsible for the judge's 
retention might think it should have been decided. ,£ 
I. INTRODUCfION 
The national debate about the role of judges, their qualifica-
tions and ideologies consumes news coverage, as evidenced by the 
recent appointment hearings of Chief Justice John Roberts and 
Justice Samuel Alito and the aborted nomination of Harriet Miers. 
The American Bar Association is in the process of re-evaluating and 
updating its Model Code of Judicial Conduct.~ The poverty of the 
quality of the debate, with legislators on both sides of the aisle dis-
cussing a few political issues and largely ignoring issues of ethics 
and temperament, leaves the public with little helpful information 
about whether judicial candidates will abide by the Canons of Judi-
cial Ethics,4 which may be the most reliable and pertinent standards 
I J. Amy Dillard is an Assistant Professor of Law at the University of Baltimore 
School of Law. She obtained her J.D. from Washington and Lee University School 
of Law and her B.A. from Wellesley College. I offer thanks to my patient mentor, 
Penny Pether; to my many research assistants, Dipal Shah, Geoffrey Meyer, Jenni-
fer Travers, Cameron Arnold, and Elizabeth Tripodi; and to the retired judges, 
before whom I had the pleasure of practicing law for many years, E. Robert 
Giammittorio and Alfred D. Swersky; and to Karen Woody. 
2 Symposium, A Call to Arm5: The Need to Protect The Independence of the Judiciary, 38 
U. RICH. L. REv. 575, 577 (2004). 
, See American Bar Association:Joint Commission to Evaluate the Model Code of 
Judicial Conduct, http://www.abanet.org/judicialethics/ (last visited Oct. 17, 
2007). 
4 See American Bar Association-Model Code of Judicial Conduct 2004 Edition, 
http://www.abanet.org/cpr/mcjc/toc.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2007); Virginia's 
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for evaluating judicial temperament and aptitude. Legislators 
demonstrate discomfort with the power of judges, and they boldly 
seek to limit the power of the judiciary and to circumscribe the of-
fices of Article III judges.5 Congress has at least threatened legisla-
tion to impeach judges, create term-limits, and reduce the number 
of appeals judges.6 Despite the rhetoric to abandon the use of a 
litmus test for judicial candidates, it remains apparent on the fed-
eral stage that legislators are, even if subconsciously, using one. 
In Virginia, legislators openly apply a litmus test in the selec-
tion and reappointment processes for judges. With absolute con-
trol over the selection and reappointment process for all judges in 
the Commonwealth, members of the Virginia General Assembly, in 
session with no oral or written record and no method for capturing 
legislative history, increasingly ask pointed ideological questions to 
scrutinize judges who are carrying out their jobs ethically, in accor-
dance with the law, and with courage. Virginia's original constitu-
tion granted control of the judiciary to its General Assembly.7 
Throughout the 19th century, during two significant revisions of 
the Virginia Constitution, the General Assembly retained its com-
plete control over the selection and reappointment of every judge 
in the Commonwealth.s Today, the General Assembly maintains 
absolute control of the Commonwealth's Judiciary.9 As recently as 
Judicial System, Section III: Canons of Judicial Conduct for the Commonwealth of 
Virginia, http://www.courts.state.va.us/jirc/canons_1l2398.html (last visited Oct. 
17,2007). 
5 Joan Biskupic, Hill Repuhlicans Target Judicial Activism'; Conservatives Block Nomi-
nees, Threaten Impeachment and Term Limits, WASH. POST, Sept. 14, 1997, atAOl (not-
ing that Republicans in the 104th and 105th Congress made at least seven at-
tempts at amending the Constitution to create term limits and a mandatory re-
appointment process for federal judges) . 
6 Id. 
7 VA. CONST. (1776) (,The two Houses of Assembly shall, by joint ballot, appoint 
Judges of the Supreme Court of Appeals, and General Court,Judges in Chancery . 
. . . "). 
8 Alex B. Long, An Histarical Perspective on Judicial Selection Methods in Virginia and 
West Virginia, 18 J.L. & POL. 691, 715-16, 750-51 (2002). In 1815, the Common-
wealth adopted a significantly revised Constitution wherein the General Assembly 
ceded control over appointing the governor to direct popular election. Id. Mter 
the Civil War, Congress required Virginia to create a new Constitution as a condi-
tion of readmission to the Union. Id. Virginia bucked the trend among the states 
towards an elected judiciary, and the General Assembly held tightly to its exclusive 
control over all members of the bench. Id. 
9 vA. CaNST. art. VI, § 7 ("The justices of the Supreme Court shall be chosen by the 
vote of a m:oyority of the members elected to each house of the General Assembly 
for terms of twelve years. The judges of all other courts of record shall be chosen 
by the vote of a majority of the members elected to each house of the General 
Assembly for terms of eight years."). 
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1970, the Commonwealth reviewed and retained her unique prac-
tice of granting absolute control over the judiciary to the General 
Assembly.lO 
The problem of selecting and applying a litmus test is not ex-
clusive to Virginia, but the unique appointment process creates a 
vortex of power for legislators to disable judges who take unpopu-
lar stands. If the point of appointing judges is to free them from 
populist criticism at the ballot box, then Virginia has not accom-
plished her goal. In fact, legislators confront judges in closed hear-
ings with no transcript for their constituents, thus making it easier 
to confront judges with frank and base political criticism, bypassing 
the need for true assessment of performance and criteria based on 
judicial ethics, ability, and temperament. 
The General Assembly maintains no legislative history or re-
cord of its proceedings.1I The history and process of judicial selec-
tion are entirely secret in Virginia, save for a few tenacious report-
ers' recollections. Accordingly, the data for this article is generally 
ephemeral, comprising newspaper articles and interviews with 
judges and other direct participants. Though my methodology is 
somewhat unconventional, it is the only approach I have discovered 
to obtain the information. 
In Part One, I will examine the history of the selection and re-
appointment process and the procedure used by the General As-
sembly. I will survey the recent history of increased politicization of 
the judicial selection and reappointment processes. In Part Two, I 
will offer an overview of Virginia's Canons of Judicial Ethics and 
will show how the Canons governing judicial ethics are a universal 
guide in assessing judges. I will explain the role of the Judicial In-
quiry and Review Commission (lIRC) and the transparency of us-
ing complaints made to, and decisions rendered by, the Commis-
sion in assessing whether a sitting judge should be reappointed, 
rather than secret and naked ideological questioning based on a 
political litmus test.12 In Part Three, I will examine three case stud-
ies of highly qualified judges who experienced the ritual humilia-
tion and intimidation of a litmus test reappointment process. Each 
judge rendered a decision or a dissent that was well within the 
bounds of the statutory and common law of Virginia. Each com-
10 A.E. DICK HOWARD, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF VIRGINIA 739-46 
(1974). "The Commission on Constitutional Revision considered alternative plans 
[of judicial selection] .... The Commission saw no advantage to those plans over 
the method of judicial selection in Virginia." Id. at 742. 
II See Virginia Division of Legislative Services-Legislative Reference Center, 
http://dls.state.va.us/lrc/leghist.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2007). 
12 See VA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-901 (West 2007). 
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plied with the requirements of the Canons and would not have 
been subject to lIRC review for misconduct. 
This is a longstanding problem in Virginia that I am identify-
ing, and solutions are not simple. I will conclude by offering a so-
lution to stop the emergence of the litmus test and establish a re-
view method for reappointment that requires the General Assembly 
to determine (1) whether a judge has engaged in misconduct re-
sulting in an investigation or reprimand by lIRC; and (2) whether 
the judge has acted within the boundaries set by the Canons. 
While many scholars examine what philosophies a judge should 
ascribe to, few examine the mechanics of judicial qualification, 
even in the aftermath of the aborted Harriet Miers nomination. 
The impoverished national debate of what it means to be a good 
judge may start with this examination of the laboratory that is Vir-
ginia, one based on the absolute control of the legislature in judi-
cial selection. 
II. PROCESS FOR SELECTION AND REAPPOINTMENT,lUDICIAL 
RETIREMENT, AND RECENT POLlTIClZATION OF THE PROCESS 
A. Legislative Control Over Appointment and Reappointment of Judges 
In Virginia, members of the General Assembly make appoint-
ments to the judiciary.13 Virginia is the only state that retains a 
method of judicial selection by strict legislative appointment. 14 This 
method, as suggested by some critics, may prove advantageous by 
overcoming the problem of voter apathy and offering an indirect 
legislator check. ls Legislative appointment determines who will fill 
vacancies in the Commonwealth's Supreme Court, Court of Ap-
peals, Circuit Courts, and the General District Courts.16 
I' VA. CONST. art. VI, § 7 (''The justices of the Supreme Court shall be chosen by 
the vote of a majority of the members elected to each house of the General As-
sembly for terms of twelve years. The judges of all other courts of record shall be 
chosen by the vote of a majority of the members elected to each house of the 
General Assembly for terms of eight years. . .. Upon election by the General 
Assembly, a new justice shall begin service of a full term."). 
14 See Judicial Selection Report-Chapter 4, 
http://www.cga.ct.gov/pri/archives/200Qisreportchap4.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 
2007) (outlining several states' various methods of judicial selection and highlight-
ing the Commonwealth of Virginia as the sole body to which the legislature nomi-
nates and elects its judges). 
15 See, e.g., The League of Women Voters of Michigan: LWVMIJudicial Study 2002, 
http://www.lwvrni.org/shared/judicialstudy2002.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2007) 
(providing the example that a voter may choose not to vote for her legislator if she 
disapproves of the performance of the judge selected by her legislator). 
16 VA. CONST. art. VI, § 7. 
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Established in 2000, the Joint Judicial Advisory Committee of-
fers advice to the General Assembly on the qualifications of 
judges.17 Both lawyers and laypersons compose the fourteen-
member committee. The group conducts interviews of potential 
candidates and seeks input from state and local bar associations, 
civic groups, and citizens.ls Mter these organizations submit nomi-
nations and remarks about candidates to the committee, the com-
mittee evaluates the recommendations. In addition, several Repub-
lican legislators have created local citizen commissions to screen 
nominees for both Circuit and District Court judgeships.19 The 
committee then submits its findings to the House and Senate for 
consideration.2o 
Virginia's judicial appointment scheme does not violate the 
Federal Constitution's doctrine of separation of powers even 
though it vests in the legislature absolute control over the judici-
ary.21 The separation of powers principle derives from the first 
three articles of the United States Constitution which vests each of 
the three branches of the United States government with their re-
I7 See LaToya Gray, Virginia's Judicial Selection Process, 9 J. OF THE AM. SOC'Y OF LEGIS. 
CLERKS & SECRETARIES 2, 14 (2003),' available at 
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/legismgt/aslcs/jrnFal103.pdf; GOP Forms Judges 
Panel, RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH, Jan. 11, 2000, at B-4 (stating that the Republi-
cans established this committee after the 1999 Republican gain of the majority in 
both the House and the Senate); see also Judge Picking; Toward Merit-Selection; GOP 
Reformers Want a Better Appointment Process-Stressing Qualifications, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, 
Jan. 15, 2000, at B6 (noting the Republicans' desire to form a committee in order 
to examine judges' qualifications). 
18 See, e.g., Virginia Women Attorney's Association:Judicial Screening Process, 
http://www.vwaa.org/judicial.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2007) (giving an overview 
of the VWAA Judiciary Committee in judicial appointments in Virginia). The 
VWAAJudicial Committee gathers and disseminates information to its members 
and to the public about potential candidates for state and federal judgeships in 
the Commonwealth. ld. The Committee then gathers information from the can-
didate through interviews and references and offers recommendations about can-
didate positions and philosophies. ld. The Committee meets with this informa-
tion and submits recommendations to the Board of Directors, who may choose to 
endorse the candidate through a two-thirds mcyority vote. ld. The endorsements 
are then sent to the applicable legislative appointing body. ld. 
19 See Gray, supra note 17, at 15 (last visited Oct. 17,2007) (citingJudicial Selection 
in Virginia: An Introduction, http://www.ajs.org/js/VA.htm) . 
20 Judicial Selection in Virginia: An Introduction, http://www.CYs.org/js/VA.htm 
(last visited October 17, 2007). 
21 See U.S. Const. art. I, § 1 (bestowing the legislative powers on Congress, which 
consists of the Senate and the House of Representatives); see also U.S. Const. art. 
II, § 1 (vesting the executive power of the United States in the President); U.S 
Const. art. III, § 1 (conferring the judicial power of the United States in one Su-
preme Court and inferior courts as established by Congress). 
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spective powers.22 However, the U.S. Constitution does not dictate 
a particular plan for the states' internal distribution of governmen-
tal powers.23 Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that 
the separation of powers concept, although essential to the U.S. 
Constitution, is not mandatory in state governments.24 
Although the Virginia Constitution also upholds a tripartite ar-
rangement of the state government, Virginia's judicial appointment 
scheme most likely does not violate its Constitution's separation of 
powers doctrine.25 In the past, when confronted with an allegation 
that a statute or an activity by a government department may violate 
this separation of powers principle, the Virginia Supreme Court has 
applied the "whole power" doctrine.26 The Court has held that no 
Article III violation exists where the "whole power" doctrine has not 
been violated.27 Virginia has relied on the "whole power" doctrine 
to justify the legislative branch's encroachment upon the executive 
branch28 and the executive branch's encroachment upon the judi-
• 29 
Clary. 
22 See U.S. CONST. art. I-III. 
2' See Mayor of Philadelphia v. Educ. Equal. League, 415 U.S. 605, 615 n.13 (1974) 
(noting that the Federal Constitution "does not impose on the States any particu-
lar plan for the distribution of governmental powers"). 
24 See Sweezy v. N.H., 354 U.S. 234, 255 (1957). 
25 See VA. CONST. art. III, § 1 ('The legislative, executive, and judicial departments 
shall be separate and distinct, so that none exercise the powers properly belonging 
to the others, nor any person exercise the power of more than one of them at the 
same time .... "). 
26 See Winchester & Strasburg R.R. Co. v. Commonwealth, 55 S.E. 692, 694 (Va. 
1906) (explaining that the meaning of the whole power doctrine is "that the whole 
power of one of these departments should not be exercised by the same hands 
which possess the whole power of either of the other departments"). 
27 [d. at 693-94 (contending that it is possible for some of the powers of the three 
branches to be united without violating the Constitution). 
28 See BaIiles v. Mazur, 297 S.E.2d 695, 700--01 (Va. 1982) (upholding a Virginia 
statute empowering the General Assembly to authorize or reject projects proposed 
by the Virginia Public Building Authority, which is under the authority of the ex-
ecutive branch); see also NAACP v. Comm. on Offenses Against the Admin. of Jus-
tice, 101 S.E.2d 631, 635, 640 (Va. 1958), vacated, 358 U.S. 40 (1958) (purporting 
that the legislative department can properly investigate the manner and result of 
law enforcement and execution by the executive branch). 
29 See Tross v. Commonwealth, 464 S.E.2d 523,530-31 (Va. Ct. App. 1995) (stating 
that judicial intake officers, who are executive officers, do not exercise the whole 
power of the judiciary when these officers determine whether sufficient probable 
cause exists to authorize petitions charging criminal offenses during the Virginia 
juvenile intake process). 
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B. Judicial Selection and Reappointment Process Used try the Legislature 
The justices of the Supreme Court shall be chosen by the vote 
of a m,yority of the members elected to each house of the Gen-
eral Assembly for terms of twelve years. The judges of all other 
courts of record shall be chosen by the vote of a majority of the 
members elected to each house of the General Assembly for 
terms of eight years .... Upon election by the General Assem-
bly, a new justice shall begin service of a full term.30 
7 
For reappointment, a judge must interview with a legislative 
committee and subsequently receive a majority vote in the legisla-
ture.31 All Virginia Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, Circuit 
Court, and General District Court judges are subject to this proc-
ess.32 Members of the legislature became concerned that the legis-
lature did not have the faculties to adequately review members of 
the judiciary. 33 The legislature attributed this to its members' part-
time nature and the diminishing number of practicing attomeys.34 
In response, H.B. 2445, enacted during the General Assembly's 
2001 session, established a pilot program for local judicial review 
and nominations.35 Under H.B. 2445, judges are evaluated in the 
year before their term expires.36 The evaluations serve two pur-
poses: first, as a method of informing professional development for 
judges, and second, as an information source for reappointment 
37 purposes. 
go SeeVA. CONST. art. VI, § 7. 
31 Judicial Selection in the States: Virginia-Current Methods of Judicial Selection, 
http://www.ajs.org/js/va_methods.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2007) (explaining 
that the Courts of Justice Committees of the House of Delegates and the Senate 
interview candidates who seek reelection, and these candidates are then voted on 
by both full houses) . 
.. See id. (explaining that all judges are subject to the interview process prior to the 
election and reelection process). 
"See H.RJ. Res. 212, Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2000), available oJ 
http://legl.state.va.us/ cgi-bin/legp504.exe?001 +fiIi+HJ212ER+pdf (establishing a 
task force to design ajudicial performance evaluation program) . 
... See id. Membership in the Virginia General Assembly is not full-time employ-
ment, as the General Assembly meets for only thirty days in odd-numbered years 
and sixty days in even numbered years. See VA. CONST. art. IV, § 6. 
SeeVA. CONST. art. IV, § 6 
35 H.R. 2445, Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2001), available at 
http://legl.state.va.us/ cgi-bin/legp504.exe?0 11 +ful+HB2445+pdf. 
!!6 Id. (mandating that the report of the judge's evaluation shall be transmitted to 
the clerks of the House and Senate). 
" Id. See a£w H.R.J. Res. 212. 
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C. judicial Retirement 
The General Assembly creates a structural incentive to serve as 
a judge, hoping to attract potential candidates to reappointment by 
offering a well-pronounced financial reward. The most highly 
qualified members of the Virginia Bar generally earn significantly 
more money than their judicial counterparts on the bench. Be-
yond the honor and duty of serving on the bench, the retirement 
benefit may be the only financial incentive that a successful practic-
ing lawyer would lose out on by not becoming a judge who is a pub-
lic servant at a much-reduced salary. 
The General Assembly enacts and enforces laws stipulating the 
conditions, duties, and compensation concerning the retirement of 
judges and justices.38 The General Assembly granted the Board of 
Trustees of the Virginia Retirement System (VRS) authority to ad-
minister the Judicial Retirement System, which regulates the com-
pensation awarded to retiringjudges.39 
Through VRS, judges acquire eligibility for unreduced retire-
ment benefits based on age at retirement and years of service.40 
VRS sets the retirement benefit based on an average of the thirty-
six months of highest salary.41 If the General Assembly appointed 
or elected ajudge to an original term on or after January 1, 1995, 
he or she earns two and one-half years of weighted service credit 
for each year of full-time service as a judge.42 However, a judge ap-
pointed or elected before January 1,1995, will earn three and one-
half years of weighted service.43 
Ajudge may retire with a reduced benefit as early as age fifty-
five if he or she has at least five years of credited service.44 If a 
judge does not meet the age or service requirements for retire-
ment, VRS reduces the benefits.45 Judicial Retirement Service 
.. See VA. CONST. art. VI, § 9. 
'9 VA. CODE ANN. § 51.1-300, -302 (West 2007). 
40 VA. CODE ANN. § 51.1-305, -306 (West 2007). 
41 See Virginia Retirement Systemjudicial Retirement System, 
http://www.varetire.org/employers/benefitplans/jrs.html(last visited Oct. 17, 
2007) (noting that judges are eligible for unreduced retirement benefits at age 60 
if they have thirty years of service and at age 65 if they have at least five years of 
credited service) . 
• 2 SeeVA. CODE ANN. § 51.1-303 (West 2007) (explaining that credited service is the 
total of weighted and unweighted service). 
43 See id. 
4. § 51.1-305. 
45 See Judicial Retirement System, supra note 41 (explaining that benefits will be 
reduced one-half percent per month for the first sixty months and four-tenths 
percent for each additional month an individual falls short of meeting the age or 
service requirements for an unreduced benefit). 
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members who the General Assembly appointed to an original or 
subsequent term after July 1, 1993, must retire at age seventy.46 The 
retirement must be within twenty days of the convening of the next 
regular session of the General Assembly after the member reaches 
age seventy.47 If appointed before January 1995, ajudge may reach 
the maximum benefit after thirteen years of actual service as a 
judge. If appointed after January 1995, ajudge will meet his or her 
maximum after eighteen years of actual judicial service. For exam-
ple, a thirty-seven year old woman could be appointed to the 
bench, obtain reappointment twice, and retire at fifty-five. She 
could return to practice and still receive her full judicial retirement 
benefits (likely, upwards of $130,000 annually) for the rest of her 
life. 
For these reasons, judges will most likely seek reappointment 
to reach their maximum benefit for retirement. The financial in-
centive is tremendous, especially given the pay cut most judges take 
when they abandon private practice for the bench. Because no 
justice or judge in Virginia has a term that is greater than twelve 
years, reaping the benefits of the retirement system requires reap-
pointment.48 For instance, if the General Assembly appointed a 
judge to an eight-year term in 1996, the judge would need to seek 
reappointment twice in order to be eligible for the maximum re-
tirement benefit allotment in 2014. 
The General Assembly sets out all judicial compensation, 
though cities and counties may supplement salaries of any local 
judges within their geographical boundaries.49 As of October 2004, 
Virginia ranked above the mean among all the states and provinces 
of the United States for judicial compensation.50 Specifically, in 
2001, a Supreme Court justice in Virginia received about $135,000 
plus $6,000 in expenses, compared to the average $127,169.51 Fur-
thermore, a judge on the Court of Appeals of Virginia received 
$128,730, in contrast to the national average of $123,629.52 The 
average Virginia trial court judge received $125,795, compared to 
$110,330 nationally.53 Overall, Virginia pays the fifteenth highest 
46 § 5l.l-305. 
47 [d. 
48 SeeVirginia-Current Methods ofJudidal Selection, supra note 3l. 
49 SeeVA. CONST. art. VI, § 9. 
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wage in the union to its Supreme Court justices, the twelfth highest 
to its Court of Appeals judges, and the tenth highest to its trial 
court judges.54 To understand how the General Assembly values its 
judges, consider that Virginia ranks in the bottom five in expendi-
tures for kindergarten through high school level education, wel-
fare, and natural resources.55 
D. Brief History of the Recent Politicization oj the Judicial Reappointment 
Process and Unsuccessful Reform Efforts 
For the greater part of the twentieth century, the Democratic 
Party in Virginia maintained control over the General Assembly.56 
In the late 1990s, partisan struggles in the General Assembly in-
creasingly shaped the selection of Virginia's judges.57 For several 
decades, the Democratic Party maintained control over the Senate 
and consequently, also controlled the judicial selection process due 
to its veto power.58 This changed in 1995 when the Senate became 
evenly split along party lines.59 In 1996, the General Assembly 
failed to fill thirty percent of judicial vacancies due to partisan 
squabbles,60 requiring Governor George Allen to appoint judges to 
these positions after its session ended.61 Interim judicial appoint-
ments expire at the beginning of the following General Assembly 
session and are not renewable without appointment by the General 
Assembly; 62 thus, they offer no job security for the appointed judge. 
54 Id. 
55 Bill Sizemore, Virginia Ranks Near Bottom of the Class, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Dec. 22, 
2002,atAl. 
56 Warren Fiske, Reachingfor a Renaissance for Gov. Georf!.e F. Allen, The Republican 
Party s Leading Man in Virginia, Nov. 7 Will Be a Defining MOTJUmt as the GOP Seeks To 
Wrest Control of the General Assembly, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Oct. 29,1995, at A-I, available 
at http://scholar.lib.vt.edu/V A-news/V A-
Pilot/issues/1995/vp951029/10290142.htm. 
57 See Ross MacKenzie, Editorial, On the Growing Parlisanization of the General Assem-
bly, RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH, Jan. 19, 1997, at F-7 (noting that the General As-
sembly'S partisanship left a number of vacancies to interim appointments). 
58 See Laura LaFay & Robert Litde, Judging by Gridlock, Allen Will Pick New Justice 




60 See MacKenzie, supra note 57. 
61 Id. See also William Ruberry, Odd Coalition Likes System as It Is; Critics Suggest Merit 
Selection of State Judges, RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH, Jan. 16, 1995, at Al ("When the 
Virginia General Assembly is out of session, interim judicial appointments for 
Circuit, Appeals and Supreme courts fall to the governor .... "). 
62 VA. CONST. art. 6, § 7. 
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As a result, few qualified candidates are able to accept an interim 
appointment. 
In February 1997, Democrats attempted to reappoint Judge 
David B. Summerfield to the Juvenile and Domestic Relations 
Court.63 However, Republican Senator William C. Wampler, Jr. 
argued that Judge Summerfield's position should go to Greg Baker, 
a law partner of Republican Delegate Terry G. Kilgore. 64 Republi-
cans denied that this decision was based on patronage, claiming 
that they were troubled by Judge Summerfield's "demeanor" and 
allegations that Summerfield behaved in a "condescending" man-
ner towards attorneys who appeared before him.65 The General 
Assembly not only declined to reappoint Judge Summerfield; it 
failed to appoint a replacement.66 
Mter Virginia Supreme Court Justice Roscoe B. StephensonJr. 
announced his retirement, Democrats and Republicans in the 
General Assembly fought over whom to appoint to replace him.67 
Democrats chose Margaret P. Spencer, an Mrican-American Gen-
eral District Court judge from Richmond.68 Republicans in the 
Senate sought former Roanoke Delegate G. Steven Agee.69 Refus-
ing to even question Spencer as a viable candidate, Senate Republi-
cans walked out of the Senate Courts of the Justice Committee's 
planned interview with Spencer.70 On the day before the General 
Assembly was scheduled to adjourn for the year, a fierce debate 
ensued.71 The conflict ended in a stalemate.72 In May, Governor 
Allen appointed Cynthia D. Kinser, a Republican federal judge, to 
fill the vacancy, and in its following term, the General Assembly 
appointed Judge Kinser.73 
6' See Ruth S. Intress & Michael Hardy, House, Senate at Impasse on Judicial Appoint-




67 Jeff E. Schapiro, Lawmakers Battle Over Appointment, RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH, 
Feb. 18, 1997,atA~. 
68 Jeff E. Schapiro, Democrats Back Richmond Judge for Top Court; GOP Senators Favor 
Roanoke Republican, RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH, Feb. 19,1997, at A-6. 
69 Id. See also Spencer S. Hsu, Virginia Lawmakers Haggle Over Supreme Court Nominee; 
New Member Could Shift Balance of Pane~ WASH. POST, Feb. 21, 1997, at DOl. 
70 Jeff E. Schapiro, Beyer Supports Black Judge; Republicans Scored for Shunning City's 
Spencer, RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH, Feb. 20,1997, atA-1. 
71 Jeff E. Schapiro, Legislators Fail to Elect Justice of Supreme Court, RICHMOND TIMES 
DISPATCH, Feb. 22,1997, atA-7. 
72 Id. See also Spencer S. Hsu, Va. Lawmakers at Impasse Over NamingJustice; Politics 
Stymie Appointment; Bills May Be Delayed or Killed, WASH. POST, Feb. 22, 1997, at COl. 
" Warren Fiske & Laurence Hammack, Allen Taps Judicially Conservative Woman for 
Supreme Court Post, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, May 3, 1997, at B5. See also Ellen Nakashima, 
12 CUMBERLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:1 
That same year, Senate Democrats' attempted to reappoint 
Clarke County Circuit Court Judge James L. Berry, who famously 
refused to grant a gun permit to Oliver North. This attempt also 
ended in a stalemate, when Republicans sought to replace Judge 
Berry with attorney John Reed Prosser.74 Once again, the stalemate 
left the Republican Governor with the option to appoint a judge 
during the interim. Governor Allen eventually appointed Prosser, 
thereby unseating Berry. 75 
In 1998, the House of Delegates remained evenly split along 
party lines, while Republicans gained a majority in the Senate.76 On 
January 31, 1998, a "nine-hour standoff" occurred after Thelma 
Drake, the only Republican among four delegates from Norfolk, 
fought her Democratic colleagues' attempt to appoint Joseph A. 
Leafe, former Mayor of Norfolk, to the Norfolk Circuit Court.77 
When the standoff ended, thirty positions, including the one for 
which Leafe vied, remained vacant.78 Although General Assembly 
members managed to agree upon the appointment of fIfty-six 
judges,79 they decided to put off making decisions about the other 
positions until the following month.80 Republicans and Democrats 
eventually agreed to appoint Leafe to the position.81 
In March 1998, the General Assembly appointed ten judges, 
but Republicans and Democrats could not agree upon a candidate 
for the Virginia Court of Appeals.82 In October 1998, Democrats in 
Allen Na1TU3s Moderate Republican Woman to Va. High Court, WASH. POST, May 3, 1997, 
at B03. 
7. See Michael Hardy, Allen Ousts Judge, Na1TU3s Successor; Assembly Had Deadlocked on 
Post, RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH, May 8, 1997, at M. 
75 Id. 
76 Laura LaFay & Ledyard King, Party Fight in Legislature Delays Leafe's Judge Quest; 
Norfolil Del. Drake Stirs Up Wrath in Both Houses, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Jan. 31, 1998, at 
AI. 
77 Id. Drake, claiming the Democrats from the Norfolk delegation left her "out of 
the judicial loop," refused to back Leafe's appointment "unless she was guaranteed 
veto power over the selection of Norfolk's new Juvenile and Domestic Relations 
Court judgeship." Id. 
78 Id. 
,. Id. 
80 Pamela Stallsmith & Tyler Whitley, GOP Gets Say on Judges; Democrats See Power 
Play; S01TU3 Decisions Wait, RICHMOND TIMES DISPATcH,Jan. 31, 1998, at A-I. 
81 Jon Frank, FOT1lU3T Mayor Starts 3rd Career, With Gave~· Leafe Now Serving as Norfolk's 
Newest Circuit Court Judge, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Apr. 28, 1998, at BI. At this time, Re-
publicans and Democrats also agreed upon a candidate for the Juvenile and Do-
mestic Relations judgeship that had been at the center of the struggle between 
Thelma Drake and her Democratic colleagues on the Norfolk delegation. Id. 
82 Pamela Stallsmith, 10 Judges Elected; 1 Spot Open, RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH, Mar. 
16,1998, atA-8. 
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the General Assembly proposed establishing a non-partisan judicial 
nomination commission, despite the fact that Democratic General 
Assembly members had resisted similar suggestions in the past.83 In 
1998, Republicans were the ones rejecting the idea.84 
Neither party is more to blame than the other for politicizing 
the judicial selection and reappointment process, though the most 
extensive reporting has occurred in recent years while the Republi-
cans have been in control of both houses of the General Assembly.85 
Mter the 1999 election, Republicans maintained a 21-19 majority in 
the Senate and gained a 52-47 majority in the House.86 Republicans 
in the General Assembly almost immediately pushed for a move 
towards merit-selection of judges.87 In 2000, the House of Dele-
gates and the Senate passed House Joint Resolution No. 212, re-
questing "the Judicial Council o~ the Supreme Court of Virginia ... 
recommend evaluation criteria for the judiciary."88 
In January 2000, Republican General Assembly members es-
tablished citizens' committees in various localities to "complement 
the recommendations of local bar associations.,,89 Until the recent 
changes in procedure by the General Assembly, local bar associa-
tions have played an integral role in vetting and offering candidates 
for the bench.90 That same month, Republican General Assembly 
members announced their plans to establish "a GOP-controlled 
commission to advise state lawmakers on judicial appointment.,,91 
For example, Republican General Assembly members from Virginia 
Beach and Norfolk created committees to screen local judicial can-
didates.92 Although Norfolk has more Democrats than Republicans 
83 Tyler Whitley, GOP Lmes Way of PickingJudges, Wants Its Chance, RICHMOND TIMES 
DISPATCH, Oct. 3, 1998, at B-5. 
84 Id. 
85 See Interview with E. Robert Giarnmittorio, Chief Judge Alexandria General 
District Court, in Alexandria, Va. Ouly, 2003) (on file with author). Judge Giarn-
mittorio spoke at length about the trouble that Republicans had getting any judge 
selected by Republicans onto the bench during the many years that the Democrats 
controlled both houses in the General Assembly. Id. 
86 Stephen Dinan, Vi1ginia GOP in Driver's Seat After the Long Road to Victory, WASH. 
TIMES, Nov. 7, 1999, at Cl. 
87 Editorial, Judge-Picking; Toward Merit-Selection; GOP &formers Want a Better Ap-
pointment Process-Stressing Qualifications, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Jan. 15,2000, at B6. 
86 H.R]. Res. 212. 
89 GOP Forms Judges Pane~ supra note 17. 
90 Interview with Melinda Douglas and Jim Lay, Selection Committee Members. 
91 R. H. Melton & Justin Blum, GOP Leaders Leap at Chance to Reform Court Selections, 
WASH. POST, Jan. 12,2000, at B05. 
92 Jennifer Peter, Vi1ginia: GOP Wants OPen Process of EvaluatingJudicial Candidates, 
VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Jan. 12,2000, at AI. 
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in the General Assembly, Republicans choose the members of the 
Norfolk committee.93 
By late January 2000, Republicans had established the Joint 
Judicial Advisory Committee and appointed all fourteen members 
of the "bipartisan panel.,,94 Democratic General Assembly members 
considered a resolution backing the creation of the Committee.95 
Some who opposed the resolution argued that going on record in 
support of the Republicans' plan would create the impression that 
Democrats had "thrown in the towel and given up on its chances of 
winning back control.,,96 Others asserted that the Committee gave 
Republicans more power because they would be in charge of select-
ing its members.97 Those who favored the resolution contended 
that the Democratic party owed its recent losses, in part, to its 
members' resistance to merit-based selection of judges.98 Ulti-
mately, the Democratic legislators voted down the resolution.99 
In March of 2000, Democrats cried foul when Suffolk Delegate 
Chris Jones chose Norfolk-based attorney D. Arthur Kelsey for a 
position as a Circuit Court judge in Suffolk, despite his lack of fa-
miliarity with Suffolk's legal landscape.loo That same month the 
General Assembly also elevated appellate judge Donald W. Lemons 
to the Virginia Supreme Court with little controversy.lOl 
As the 2000 General Assembly Session drew to a close, the Rich-
mond Times-Dispatch claimed that "the new system worked," because 
the bipartisan JointJudicial Advisory Committee had reviewed most 
of the candidates for various judgeships that year and "the Assem-
bly agreed on the appointments with a minimum of partisan bick-
ering.,,102 However, others pointed out that the m~ority of the 
93 Matthew Dolan, State Looks at Ways to judge the judges A Growing Movement, Led by 
Republicans, Aims to Make Tlwse on the Bench More Accountable for Their Performances, 
VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Jan. 29, 2001, atAl. 
94 Metro in Brief: Vi7ginia: GOP's Picks for judicial Advisory Pane~ WASH. POST, Jan. 28, 
2000, at B3;Judiciai Selection in Virginia, supra note 20. 
95 Tyler Whitley, Proposal on judges Rejected; Democrats Dislike Merit Selection Plan, 





100 Meredith Kruse, judicial Pick is "Radical Departure" DeL Chris jones Picks "Outsider" 
for Circuit Court, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Mar. 4, 2000, at Bl. 
101 Jeff E. Schapiro, Lerrwns Voted to Vi7ginia High Court; 22 Others Appointed to State 
judgeships, RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH, Mar. 9, 2000, at A-6. 
102 Editorial, judicial Selection, RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH, Mar. 17, 2000, at A-14. 
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members of the Committee were Republicans, as were many of the 
. d 103 newJu ges. 
In September 2003, David Baugh, a criminal defense lawyer 
from Richmond, fIled suit in a Richmond Circuit Court seeking an 
injunction prohibiting members of the General Assembly from 
questioning candidates for judgeships about previous decisions or 
decisions they might make in future cases.104 According to Baugh, 
the General Assembly's interrogation sessions violated the Virginia 
Constitution that mandates the three branches of government re-
. " d d" ,,105 mam separate an lstmct. 
III. THE CANONS AND THEJUDICIAL INQUIRY AND REVIEW 
COMMISSION: THE TRANSPARENT METHODS FOR REVIEW 
A. Canons of Judicial Ethics 
Several of the Canons of Judicial Conduct for the Common-
wealth of Virginia are applicable to judicial reappointment. 106 The 
following describes the Canons and the Sections (each of which is 
authoritative) and the Commentary (which is advisory)107 that 
should direct the decision-making and conduct of Virginia judges. 
Canons are available in each state as a guide for judges' comport-
ment both on and off the bench, and many state legislatures turn 
to the ABA Model Code for Judicial Conduct as a guide. lOB 
The General Assembly charged the judges of the Common-
wealth with the task of interpreting and applying the laws by strict 
adherence to the Canons. I09 A fundamental doctrine of the Canons 
is that judges adjudicate matters with disregard for political views 
and motivations.110 For instance, Canon Three, "AJudge Shall Per-
form the Duties of Judicial Office Impartially and Diligently," man-
dates a duty of political indifference, stating that a 'Judge shall not 
be swayed by partisan interests, public clamor or fear of criti-
cism. "lll The General Assembly further determined in Canon 
10. Michael Hardy & Jeff E. Schapiro, Rating the New Leadership; Legislators See Assem-
bly Session in Differrmt Lights, RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH, Mar. 12,2000, at A-I. 
104 Alan Cooper, Baugh Sues Over Questions Posed to Judges, RICHMOND TIMES 
DISPATCH, Sept. 25, 2003, at B-3. 
I05Id. (citing VA. CONST. art. III, § 1). 
106 See Canons of Judicial Conduct, supra note 4. 
107 Id. 
108 See grmerally Model Code of Judicial Conduct 2004 Edition, supra note 4. 
109 See Canons of Judicial Conduct, supra note 4. 
110 See id. (noting that Canon 1 indicates that the standards of Virginia's judicial 
system are based on the concept of a fair and independent judiciary). 
111 See id. 
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Three that a judge shall be "faithful to the law and maintain profes-
sional competence in it.,,1l2 The Canons stipulate that a judge must 
perform duties without bias or prejudice: A judge shall not, "by 
words or conduct manifest bias or prejudice ... based upon race, 
sex, religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation or 
socioeconomic status. ,,113 
The commentary to Canon One, "A Judge Shall Uphold the 
Integrity and Independence of the Judiciary,,,1l4 notes that the "in-
tegrity and independence of judges depends in turn upon their 
acting without fear or favor. Although judges should be independ-
ent, they must comply with the law, including the provisions of 
these Canons.,,1l5 Canon Two emphasizes the importance of judi-
cial appearances, stating that a judge "shall act at all times in a 
manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and im-
partiality of the judiciary."ll6 The General Assembly has made it 
clear that politics should not affect judges.ll7 Furthermore, the 
General Assembly's evaluation process will comprise of a review of 
the judge's commitment and strict adherence to these rules of im-
partiality, the application of the law, and freedom from partisan 
tensions.1l8 
Political impartiality should not only pervade judicial decision-
making and serve as the primary basis for review during reap-
pointment, but theoretically, it should also serve as fundamental 
criteria in judicial selection. When determining whether to ap-
point a judge or justice, the General Assembly seeks input from 
112 See id. 
'" See id. (explaining that Canon 3B(5) outlines that this does not preclude proper 
judicial consideration when such demographic factors are issues in the proceed-
ing). 
114 See id. 
115 See Canons of Judicial Conduct, supra note 4. 
116 See id. (explaining that Canon 2(A) requires that judges must avoid conflicts of 
interest and make decisions based on a neutral application of the law without 
influence from external factors). In addition, commentary to Canon 2(b) states 
that "[m]aintaining the prestige of judicial office is essential to a system of gov-
ernment in which the judiciary functions independently of the executive and legis-
lative branches." Id. 
117See id. 
118 See id. (explaining, in the preamble, that any transgression in the canons may 
lead to the discipline of the judge). The Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission, 
composed of judges, lawyers, and non-lawyer citizens elected by the General As-
sembly, investigates complaints and takes appropriate disciplinary steps if neces-
sary. See Virginia's Judicial System-About the Judicial Inquiry & Review Commis-
sion, http://www.courts.state.va.us/pamphlets/inquiry.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 
2007). 
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several different groups, including local bar associations1l9 and the 
Virginia State Bar. 120 These organizations evaluate judges using 
general guidelines that include several characteristics, including 
but not limited to, "integrity, judicial temperament, impartiality, 
legal skills, health, management skills and public service.,,12\ In 
many ways, the characteristics mirror the actual attitudes that the 
Canons demand that judges embody. Political motivations, per-
sonal religious or moral beliefs, and attitudes or opinions about 
social issues are not among the criteria. 122 The criteria focus on 
examining the entire body of a judge's work, not isolated or spe-
cific opinions. The Virginia State Bar explicitly advises against fo-
cusing on the personal beliefs of judges, stating that "there should 
be no issue-oriented litmus test for selection of a candidate.,,123 
B. Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission Review Procedures 
Virginia's Bill of Rights states that "[tJhe legislative, executive, 
and judicial departments of the Commonwealth should be separate 
and distinct. ,,124 Article III explains that separation of powers is 
necessary "so that none exercise the powers properly belonging to 
the others.,,125 In Article VI, § 10, entitled "Disabled and Unfit 
Judges," the Virginia Constitution empowers the General Assembly 
to create the Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission.126 The 
Commission may investigate charges asserted against judges and 
"[iJf the Commission finds the charges to be well-founded, it may 
file a formal complaint before the Supreme Court.,,127 The Virginia 
Supreme Court shall then conduct a hearing to determine whether 
a judge shall be retired, removed, or censured.128 The Commission 
sometimes "settles" complaints through arbitration or other means 
h · h d . h . 129 W lC a not reqmre a eanng. 
119 Interview with Melinda Douglas and Jim Lay, Selection Comm. Members. 
120 See Jessie Halladay, lWIat Makes a Fit Judge? Criteria Are Debated; Nothing Specific Set 
in Virginia Law. DAILY PRESS, Jan. 17, 2003, at A7, available at 
http://www.dailypress.com/news/dp-33782syOjan17.0.4296151.story. 
121 Id. 
122 See id. 
123 Id. 
124 VA. CaNST. art. I, § 5. 
125 VA. CaNST. art. III, § 1. 
126VA. CaNST. art. Vi, § 10. 
127 Id. 
128 Id. 
129 This author was subpoenaed as a witness on behalf of a judge facing a Judicial 
Inquiry and Review Commission complaint, but because the judge and the com-
plaining party arbitrated a result that did not result in the need for a hearing to 
determine whether the judge would be removed, this author did not testify. 
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If the Supreme Court after the hearing on the complaint finds 
that the judge has engaged in misconduct while in office, or 
that he has persistently failed to perform the duties of his office, 
or that he has engaged in conduct prejudicial to the proper 
administration of justice, it shall censure him or shall remove 
him from office.130 
The Canons also control the conduct of Virginia's judges. 
Our legal system is based on the principle that an independent, 
fair and competent judiciary will interpret and apply the laws 
that govern us. . . . The text of the Canons and Sections is in-
tended to govern conduct of judges and to be binding upon 
them. It is not intended, however, that every transgression will 
result in disciplinary action. Whether disciplinary action is ap-
propriate, and the degree of discipline to be imposed, should 
be determined through a reasonable and reasoned application 
of the text and should depend on such factors as the serious-
ness of the transgression, whether there is a pattern of im-
proper activity and the effect of the improper activity on others 
or on the judicial system.
131 
IV. CAsE STUDIES 
There is a tension in the text of Virginia's Constitution and the 
Rules of the Court between the preservation of an independent 
judiciary and oversight by the legislature. As we examine the cases 
where the increasing politicization bore fruit of an ideological lit-
mus test, we should ask whether the General Assembly even used 
the rules of the Canons in its assessment. We should ask ourselves 
whether the legislature acted in accordance with the principles and 
spirit of Virginia's governing documents. We should ask include 
whether a judge, "engaged in misconduct while in office;" "persis-
tently failed to perform the duties of his office;" "engaged in con-
duct prejudicial to the proper administration of justice;,,132 and 
whether the legislature, when employing "reasonable and reasoned 
application of the text," found a serious "transgression" or "pattern 
of improper activity" that had a significant effect "on others or on 
the judicial system.,,133 
Before moving into the three case studies, two examples help 
set the stage. In February 2001, Republicans blocked Democrats' 
IlIOVA. CONST. art. VI, § lO. 
101 See Canons of Judicial Conduct, supra note 4. 
1>2 VA. CONST. art. VI, § lO. 
133 See Canons of Judicial Conduct, supra note 4 (describing, in the preamble, the 
manner in which the Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission should interpret 
and apply the Canons). 
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attempt to reappoint Judge Katherine Howe Jones, an Mrican-
American woman, to her position on a Norfolk General District 
Court.134 Although the Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission 
had never sanctioned Judge Jones, GOP leaders cited allegations 
that she "regularly yelled at victims and defendants, cut off witness 
testimony and laced her rulings with unnecessary sarcasm.,,135 Re-
publicans further claimed thatJudgeJones had "very serious issues" 
and displayed "bizarre behavior.,,136 However, the General Assem-
bly's Courts of Justice Committee refused to grant Judge Jones a 
hearing in which she could address the allegations. 137 Norfolk 
Delegate William P. Robinson, a Democrat, along with the local 
NAACP, felt that the Republicans' move was "racially motivated.,,138 
Democrats responded to the Republicans' attack on Judge 
Jones by grilling former prosecutor Norman A. Thomas, the Re-
publican choice for Judge Jones's position.139 Democrats noted that 
the state bar was currently investigating Thomas and that the local 
bar association previously rated him as "unqualified" to be a 
judge.140 Nonetheless, the Republican-controlled General Assem-
bly, by majority vote, appointed Thomas to Judge Jones's posi-
tion. 141 
The example involving former Judge Verbena M. Askew is 
perhaps most indicative of the fierceness of the conservative 
agenda. Conservatives in the house delayed reappointing Askew, a 
Circuit Court judge from Newport News, and eventually voted to 
remove her from the bench.142 During Askew's 2003 reappoint-
ment proceedings, the House Courts of Justice Committee, led by 
Republican Delegate Robert McDonnell, questioned Askew for 
seven hours about her sexual orientation and about alleged sexual 
134 Matthew Dolan & Christina Nuckols, GOP Blocks Judge's 2nd Appointment to Bench 
Republican:Jurist's Behavior Led to Move, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Feb. 10,2001, at BI. The 
general district courts in Virginia are courts not of record, so there is little con-
crete evidence from which the Committee could assess Judge Jones's behavior. See 
VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-69.5 (West 2007). 
m Dolan & Nuckols, supra note 134. 
1% Id. 
137 Christina Nuckols, Judge Won't Get Hearing, Say Two Key Lawmakers Stolle Joins 
Critics, Saying Courtroom Press Conference Was Sign of Indiscretion, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, 
Feb. 16,2001, at B4. 
138 Dolan & Nuckols, supra note 134. 
13' Matthew Dolan, Democrats Turn Up Heat on Candidate for Judgeship, VIRGINIAN-
PILOT, Feb. 21, 2001, at BI. 
14°Id. 
141 Matthew Dolan, Democrats Unable to Salvage Norfolk Judgeship for Jones, VIRGINIAN-
PILOT, Feb. 22, 2001, at B4. 
142 Tyler Whitley & Alan Cooper, Judge Will Not Be Re-Elected; Askew Will Vacate New-
port News Spot, RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH, Jan. 23, 2003, atAI. 
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encounters, rather than about her perfonnance as ajudge.143 The 
interrogation focused on a sexual harassment claim lodged by a 
female worker that was settled out of court by the City of Hamp-
144 Ask dl d . d d' 145 ton. ew repeate y eme wrong omg. 
Delegate Kenneth Melvin (D-Portsmouth) stated that "hearsay 
was rampant" at Askew's hearing and that the Committee's focus 
on sexual orientation was "nothing more than a philosophical lit-
mus test.,,146 Delegate Flora Crittenden (D-Newport News) reiter-
ated complaints about the Committee's conduct, stating that Askew 
"was treated like a common criminal.,,147 The Republican-
controlled General Assembly denied Askew's reappointment, bas-
ing their decision on claims that Askew lied about her advances and 
then attempted to cover them Up.148 
Askew's case is very unusual because the General Assembly had 
a debatable issue in the sexual harassment claim leveled against 
Askew. The rhetoric of the legislators involved in the hearing 
made clear that the real issue was Askew's perceived sexual orienta-
tion. 149 In one of the more telling questions from the session, dele-
'43 See Larry O'Dell, Assembly Elects Former Delegate to Supreme Court. DAILY PRESS, Jan. 
21, 2003, http://www.dailypress.com/news/dp-va-xgr-
judges0121jan21,0,1340489.story; Halladay, supra note 125; Jeff E. Schapiro & 
Pamela Stallsmith, Tension Pervades Assembly; Relations Unravel Over Askew Matter, 
RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH, Jan. 24, 2003, at A-I. 
144 R. H. Melton, GOP Grilling of judge in Va. Has Aura of a Tria~ WASI-l. POST, Jan. 
18,2003, at BOL 
''', See Alan Cooper, judge Deni£s Woman s ClULrge; Assembly Panels Hear Testirrwny in 
joint Session, RiCHMOND TIMES DISPATcH,Jan. 18,2003, at B-1. 
146 O'Dell, supra note 143. 
147 See id. 
148 Sodomy Laws, Virginia Denies Askew Seat, 
http://www.sodomylaws.org/usa/virginia/vanews102.htm (last visited on Oct. 17, 
2007). 
'49 The Republican Assembly denied Judge Askew's reappointment based more on 
her sexual orientation and an allegation of sexual harassment than on her judicial 
performance. See Whitley & Cooper, supra note 142. 
The Canons govern judicial conduct outside the courtroom as well. The Com-
mentary to Canon 3B(5) states that "ajudge must refrain from speech, gestures or 
other conduct that could reasonably be perceived as sexual harassment." See Can-
ons of Judicial Conduct, supra note 4. Canon 3C(1) states that "ajudge shall dili-
gendy discharge the judge's responsibilities without bias or prejudice and main-
tain professional competence in judicial administration." See id. 
However, Judge Askew did not dishonor these rules. Nowhere in the Canons 
does the sexual orientation of a jurist affect his or her conduct, competence, fit-
ness to serve, or the public's confidence in his or her judicial independence. See 
generally id. Indeed, the Canons preclude a judge from undertaking the precise 
prejudicial and biased behavior exhibited towards Judge Askew in her reappoint-
ment proceedings. 
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gate Robert McDonnell reportedly asked a witness how close Askew 
was sitting to a female friend at a recent dinner. 15o 
For many candidates evaluated for reappointment in the past 
several years, political issues and the social agenda of the General 
Assembly marred the reappointment process. These judges, apply-
ing the law and reasoning in a wholly unexceptionable manner, 
decided cases and issued opinions, which members of the Republi-
can-controlled General Assembly perceived as failing the conserva-
tive litmus test. Two of these cases concerned the rights of a gay 
parent, and one concerned gun control. 
A. Justice Barbara Keenan 
In January 2003, Virginia Supreme Court Justice Barbara M. 
Keenan sought reappointment. 151 Republicans in the General As-
sembly grilled Justice Keenan, as usual in an unreported session/52 
about her dissenting opinion in Bottoms v. Bottoms. 153 The case con-
cerned a maternal grandmother'S petition, filed against her daugh-
ter, for custody of her grandson. 154 The Virginia Supreme Court 
reversed an appellate court decision and granted custody of the 
child to the child's grandmother, stating that one of the factors 
considered was the mother's lesbian relationship at the time of the 
custody hearing.155 In reaching its decision, the majority deter-
mined that the sexual orientation of the mother would impose a 
burden on the child and that the child would suffer social con-
demnation stemming from exposure to homosexual living ar-
156 rangements. 
Chairman of the House Courts of Justice Committee, Del. Robert McDonnell 
(R-Virginia Beach), indicated that lawmakers have a duty to review judges' work 
product and actions when up for re-election. O'Dell, supra note 14S. Also, ac-
cording to McDonnell, individuals may not be fit to serve as judges if they violate 
the state's now debunked "crimes against nature" laws that prohibited all oral and 
anal sex. See Halladay, supra note 125. This statement instigated counter-
arguments from judicial selection experts, who remarked that the sexual orienta-
tion characteristics of judges were not part of any codified judicial selection crite-
ria. Id. McDonnell's vision stands in contradiction to any vision that treats homo-
sexuals equally, either through a role on the bench or under the law. 
150 Panel Ousts Judge They Tried to Out, THE GAY PEOPLE'S CHRONICLE, 
http://www.gaypeopleschronicle.com/stories03/03jan31.htm. 
151 See Christina Nuckols, Concerns Arise Over Judge Selection; At the Center of the General 
Assembly Issue Are Questions Over Sexual Orientatio~ VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Jan. 17,2003, at 
Bl. 
152 See id. 
153Bottomsv. Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d 102, 109 (Va. 1995) (Kennan,]., dissenting). 
154 Id. at 104. 
155 Id. at lOS'{)9. 
156 Id. at lOS. 
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Keenan dissented and maintained that the trial court improp-
erly found the mother per se unfit because of her sexual orienta-
tion.157 In her dissent, Keenan referenced the controlling law in 
the Commonwealth and the majority of states that "[a] lesbian 
mother is not per se an unfit parent.,,158 Keenan asserted that the 
court of appeals was correct when it found that "adverse effects of a 
parent's homosexuality on a child cannot be assumed without spe-
cific proof.,,159 Keenan continued that "[a]lthough there is no evi-
dencein this record showing that the mother's homosexual con-
duct is harmful to the child, the majority improperly presumes that 
its own perception of societal opinion and the mother's homosex-
ual conduct are germane to the issue [of] whether the mother is an 
unfit parent."I60 Keenan rejected the Virginia Supreme Court's 
decision as wholly based on societal perception and norms, rather 
than the issue of law at hand.161 Keenan's dissent attempts to be 
faithful to the law rather than a personal perception of societal 
opinion. She rigorously abided by the Canons, acting within their 
letter and spirit, especially with regard to the requirement for im-
. 1. 162 partla lty. 
Canon One requires a judge to "uphold the integrity and in-
dependence of the judiciary" which under Section A, "is indispen-
sable to justice in our society.,,163 The Commentary to Canon One 
provides that a judge must act "without fear or favor" and "must 
comply with the law."I64 Justice Keenan met the mandate of Canon 
One by rejecting the trial court's failure to follow the law. She re-
fused to favor a societal predisposition or succumb to a fear that 
her view would be unpopular or politically unacceptable. 
Canon Two requires a judge to avoid impropriety or the ap-
pearance of impropriety.165 While the Canon generally deals with a 
judge'S professional and personal behavior, it can also indirectly 
extend to decision-making. Thus, Section A states that a judge 
"shall respect and comply with the law" and "promotes public con-
157 Id. at 109 (citing Doe v. Doe, 284 S.E.2d 799, 806 (Va. 1981)). 
158 [d. See also Doe v. Doe, 284 S.E.2d 799, 806 (Va. 1981). 
159 Bottoms v. Bottoms, 444 S.E.2d 276, 283 (Va. Ct App. 1994), rev'd, 457 S.E.2d 
102 (Va. 1995). See also Doe, 284 S.E.2d at 805. 
160 BoUoms, 457 S.E.2d at 109. 
161 [d. 
162 See Canons of Judicial Conduct, supra note 4 (purporting, in the commentary, 
that a judge who manifests any bias in the proceedings brings the judiciary into 
disrepute) . 
163 See id. 
164 See id. 
165 See id. 
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fidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. ,,166 Section 
B provides that "[a] judge shall not allow family, social, political or 
other relationships to influence the judge's judicial conduct or 
judgment.,,167 Justice Keenan followed these precepts by freeing 
her opinion of any family, social or political prejudice, or influ-
ence. Accordingly, she sought to promote the judicial integrity and 
impartiality mandated by Canon Two. 
Canon Three requires a judge to "perform the duties of judi-
cial office impartially and diligently.,,168 Under Section B(2), "a 
judge shall be faithful to the law" and "not be swayed by partisan 
interests, public clamor or fear of criticism."169 By refusing to grant 
child custody to a grandmother over a lesbian mother, Justice 
Keenan sought to follow the law, without regard for the potential of 
public clamor or judicial criticism. Under Section B(5), ajudge is 
required to "perform judicial duties without bias or prejudice" and 
cannot "in the performance of judicial duties ... manifest bias or 
prejudice."170 Justice Keenan rejected the trial court's decision as 
one rooted in prejudice, societal perception and expectation, not 
the rule of law. She ably discharged her duty under Canon 
Three.171 
Republican legislators made their views on homosexuality and 
their conservative agenda clear through their questioning.172 Equal-
ity Virginia173 chairman Joseph R. Price accused Republican dele-
gates of "a targeted effort to get rid of judges they think are sympa-
thetic to gay issues."174 Democratic delegate Kenneth R. Melvin 
expressed concerns over Republican legislators' "inordinate curios-
ity about legal opinions that touch upon sexual orientation."175 Re-
publican delegate Bradley P. Marrs countered Melvin's comment, 
stating that "[h]omosexuality is a form of sexual misconduct that is 
166 See id. 
167 See id. 
168 See Canons of Judicial Conduct, supra note 4. 
169 See id. 
170 See id. 
17l See also id. (explaining, in the commentary, that "[a] judge who manifests bias 
on any basis in a proceeding impairs the fairness of the proceeding and brings the 
judiciary into disrepute"). 
172 See Nuckols, supra note 15l. 
m "Equality Virginia is a state-wide, non-partisan lobbying, education and support 
network for the gay, lesbian, bisexual, transgender, and straight allied (GLBT) 
commumtles in Virginia." See About Equality Virginia, 
http://www.equalityvirginia.org/site/pp.asp?c=dflIITMIG&b=132619 (last visited 
Oct. 17, 2007). 
174 Nuckols, supra note 151. 
175Id. 
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a crime I don't believe in the genetic explanation of homo-
sexuality, so to say someone is a homosexual means that person is 
engaged in illegal behavior on a regular basis.,,176 Of course, Judge 
Keenan's dissent tracked to jurisprudence of the majority opinion 
in Lawrence v. Texas. 177 A full eight years before the U.S. Supreme 
Court reached its decision, Keenan found her way to a similar 
analysis. 
The General Assembly ultimately reappointed Keenan, but 
only after thoroughly scrutinizing her dissent in Bottoms. 178 This 
scrutiny served to chill the independence of other judges, espe-
cially those who needed reappointment to achieve full retirement 
benefits. 
B. Judge Rosemarie Annunziata 
With Justice Keenan, the General Assembly frankly articulated 
the conservative ideological litmus test which it intended to use in 
the judicial reappointment process. Also in 2003, but after the 
Keenan hearing, the General Assembly reinforced the litmus test in 
its questioning of court of appeals Judge Rosemarie Annunziata.179 
The House Courts of Justice Committee postponed reappointing 
Judge Rosemarie Annunziata to the Virginia Court of Appeals,180 
asking her to return for an additional round of questioning before 
sending her nomination to the full legislature.181 This outright 
preparation for interrogation of a judicial candidate was an aberra-
tion from the past norm of judicial reappointment.182 
Republicans on the Committee were specifically concerned 
with Annunziata's opinion in Piatt v. Piatt. 183 In Piatt, the Virginia 
Court of Appeals upheld a lower court decision granting primary 
physical custody of a divorced couple's child to the husband.184 
Mter the couple separated, both the husband and wife had extra-
marital sexual relationships with women.18S Both husband and wife, 
176Id. 
I77 539 u.s. 558 (2003). 
17S See Nuckols, supra note 151. 
179 See O'Dell, supra note 143. 
ISO Nuckols, supra note 15I. 
ISIId. See also Steven Ginsberg & Michael D. Shear, In Va., Fears of a Judicial Litmus 
Test; Delay in Reappointment Highlights Tensions Over House Review Process, WASH. 
POST,jan. 16,2003, at B01. 
IS2 See id. 
IS. 499 S.E.2d 567 (Va. Ct. App. 1998). 
IS4Id. at 572. 
185 Id. at 569. 
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arguably, violated the Virginia statutes: he, the fomicationl86 and 
adulteryl87 statutes and she, the consensual sodomy statute.188 On 
appeal, the wife claimed that the lower court improperly based its 
decision on the parties' sexual orientation.189 The appellate court 
d · d 190 lsagree . 
In her dissent, Judge Annunziata found for the wife, maintain-
ing that the trial court "applied different standards when evaluating 
the parties' post-separation sexual conduct.,,191 Annunziata rea-
soned that the Court should have remanded the case and applied a 
more symmetrical analysis of the law.192 Since both parents en-
gaged in similar, arguably illegal, behavior, Judge Annunziata dis-
agreed with the majority opinion that described the mother's con-
duct as promiscuous, while asserting that the father's conduct cre-
ated a secure environment for the child.193 Annunziata reasoned 
that the trial judge, who granted custody to the father, applied "dif-
ferent standards when evaluating the parties' post-separation sexual 
conduct.,,194 Like Keenan, Annunziata chose to apply the law 
equally to both parties, in accordance with an unexceptionable 
interpretation of the prevailing common law and statutes. More-
over, she followed the letter and spirit of the Canons in her dissent, 
particularly with regard to the standards for impartiality.195 
During Judge Annunziata's lengthy reappointment hearing, 
again without a record, Del. Bradley P. Marrs, a Republican from 
Richmond, questioned Annunziata about her dissenting opinion.196 
Marrs held that "[t]he case was about whether homosexual conduct 
and heterosexual conduct were on the same plane.,,197 Continuing, 
Marrs stated that Annunziata "indicated that they were. I believe 
they were not. There were a host of factors relied upon for that 
decision. She chose to emphasize that one issue.,,198 Marrs' ideol-
ogy, however, runs directly counter to the law of the Common-
186YA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-344 (West 2007). This statute has since been held uncon-
stitutional by the Supreme Court of Virginia. See Martin v. Ziherl, 607 S.E.2d 367 
(Ya.2005). 
18'YA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-365 (West 2007). 
188 YA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-361 (West 2007). 
189 Piatt, 499 S.E.2d at 572. 
190 [d. 
191 [d. at 574 (Annunziata,]., dissenting). 
192 [d. 
193 [d. at 573. 
194 [d. at 574. 
195 See grmerally Canons of]udicial Conduct, supra note 4. 
196 See Ginsberg & Shear, supra note 18I. 
19' [d. 
198 [d. 
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wealth at the time of the Piatt decision. Under the law, courts were 
required to apply the same standard to decide what effect a non-
marital relationship will have on a child regardless of sexuality.l99 
What is problematic is that Annunziata chose to follow the law cor-
rectly and faced the retaliation of the litmus test. The treatment of 
Annunziata prompted some Democrats to express concerns that 
reappointing judges based on their ideologies undermined judicial 
independence.2OO Some Republicans agreed.201 Because the reap-
pointment hearing for Annunziata was unusually long and excep-
tionally political, the potential for chilling other judges from acting 
in accordance with the Canons, but in conflict with majority politi-
cal opinion, looms large. 
In her dissent, Judge Annunziata maintained that different 
standards of acceptable behavior should not be employed in evalu-
ating the "post-separation sexual behavior" of divorcing spouses.202 
Both the husband and wife had extramarital sexual relations with 
women, yet the majority of the court of appeals found the wife's 
conduct impermissibly promiscuous while the father's similar con-
duct did not jeopardize the child's well being.20s Judge Annunziata 
pointed to the legal requirement for symmetry.204 She maintained 
that different standards should not be imposed in determining pa-
rental fitness based on societal prejudice, ideology or sexual pref-
erence.205 Judge Annunziata followed the provisions of Canons 
One, Two, and Three and the Sections relating to ajudge's faithful 
adherence to the rule of law, impartiality, independence and free-
dom from bias, prejudice and partisanship,. These provisions, as 
described above, relate equally to the conduct and decision-making 
of Judge Annunziata. A judicial ruling based on ideology, rather 
than the impartial application of the governing legal standard, un-
derminesjudicial independence and the public's confidence in the 
judiciary.206 
199 See Piatt, 499 S.E.2d at 570 (asserting that the effect of a non-marital relationship 
on a child is not based on the parents' involvement in a homosexual or heterosex-
ual relationship but "whether it has had any adverse impact on the child."). 
200 Ginsberg & Shear, supra note 18I. 
201 Id. 
202 Piatt, 499 S.E.2d at 574. 
20. Id. at 570-74 (Annunziata,j., dissenting) . 
... Id. at 572-74 (Annunziata,j., dissenting). 
205 [d. 
206 See also Canons of Judicial Conduct, supra note 4. 
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C. Judge Alfred Swersky 
The General Assembly's recent openly biased and conservative 
agenda is clear not only in legal matters pertaining to homosexuals 
but also in other politically charged issues, specifically gun control. 
In January 2002, Alexandria Circuit Court Judge Alfred D. Swersky 
appeared before the House Courts of Justice Committee seeking 
reappointment.207 For over an hour, House Speaker S. Vance Wil-
kins, Jr., who later claimed to dislike "activist judges who want to 
make the law on their own," questioned Swersky about his unpub-
lished, trial-level decision from a case in Alexandria, Virginia.20B In 
the case, Judge Swersky upheld an Alexandria ordinance barring 
firearms from municipal worksites.209 Although Swersky's holding 
in the case was upheld by the Virginia Supreme Court, the Repub-
lican-controlled General Assembly scrutinized and questioned 
Swersky about it.210 Republican Speaker Wilkins, who sponsored a 
1989 state statute prohibiting localities from regulating ownership 
or possession of firearms, led the charge.211 Wilkins' intense ques-
tioning concerned many members of the General Assembly, espe-
cially Democrats in the House who believed that rulings on gun 
cases would become "litmus tests for reappointment to judicial 
posts.,,212 The General Assembly eventually reappointed Swersky.213 
In the case mentioned above, Judge Swersky upheld an ordi-
nance prohibiting firearms at public work sites.214 He did so in 
accordance with a specific regulation, rather than any ideological 
or political motive, basing his decision on his interpretation of 
regulations aimed at preventing violent, disruptive behavior in city 
workplaces.215 Judge Swersky acted without "fear or favor,,216 and 
207 R. H. Melton, House Speaker Presses Judge on Case, WASH. POST, Jan. 25, 2002, at 
BOS. 
208Id. 
209 Id. In his opinion, Swersky determined that the city manager had authority to 
control and regulate the use and management of handguns on city property. [d. 
The manager, Lawson, ordered the ban on firearms shortly after a shooting in 
front of a city recreation center. Id. Swersky applied the law without ideological 
motive and interpreted existing regulations prohibiting "violent, disruptive or 
inappropriate behavior by members of the public in City workplaces" to uphold 




21. See Lisa Rein, Va. House Votes to Overturn Gun Ban, WASH. POST, Feb. 2S, 2002, at 
B01; Michael D. Shear & Patricia Davis, Va. GOP Reclaims Naming of Judges; Legisla-
tors Move to Preempt Warner. WASH. POST, July 27, 2003, at COL 
214 See Sentiger v. Lawson, CH9S1074 (AlexandriaCir. Ct.Jan.13, 1999). 
215 Id. 
28 CUMBERLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 38:1 
made his decision without regard for "partisan interests, public 
clamor or fear of criticism.,,217 Since gun control is a politically 
charged issue, Judge Swersky's decision more than likely politically 
unpopular, and thus, it had the potential to have adverse conse-
quences on his reappointment. Nonetheless, Judge Swersky, fol-
lowing the Canons, refused to bow to political or societal pressure 
or fear and faithfully interpreted the law. He upheld the letter and 
spirit of the Canon, and he continued to maintain his interpreta-
tion of the law throughout his contentious reappointment hear-
. 218 mg. 
Befitting the troubles Swersky faced in re-appointment, the 
process of selecting his replacement to the circuit court was an-
other overtly politicized process, with the General Assembly show-
ing little regard for the qualifications and temperament of the can-
didates.219 In the spring of 2003, Judge Alfred D. Swersky an-
nounced his plans to retire from the bench.220 Following tradition, 
the selection committee accepted applications from candidates, 
conducted interviews, and gave reviews to the Bar members who 
then voted.221 Nolan B. Dawkins, a ten-year veteran judge in the 
juvenile court and a lifetime resident of the city of, received a rat-
ing of "exceptionally qualified" from the selection committee and 
"won" the Bar vote.222 In May, after the legislative session ended, 
five Democratic members of the General Assembly recommended 
that Governor Warner appoint Judge Dawkins to replace Judge 
Swersky.223 In July, Republicans announced that if Warner ap-
21. VA. SUP. Cr. R. Pr. 6, § III, Cannon 1 Cmt. (1999). 
217VA. SUP. CT. R. Pr. 6, § III, Canon 3(B) (2) (1999). 
218 See ge1'Uffal1y email from Judge Alfred D. Swersky, Alexandria Circuit Court Judge, 
to Author (August, 2003) (on file with author). Judge Swersky described that "the 
return to the practice of law loomed large," but that he never intended to change 
his interpretation of the law to appease legislators since that reversal would have 
been motivated by fear of losing his job rather than his own opinion. Id. 
219 See Shear & Davis, supra note 213. 
220 See id. 
221 See Interview with Melinda Douglas, Public Defender for City of Alexandria, and 
Jim Lay, Assistant Attorney for Commonwealth of Va., in Alexandria, Va. (July, 
2004) (on file with author). The Judicial Selection Committee of the Alexandria 
Bar Association follows established guidelines in interviewing, evaluating, and 
rating judicial candidates. Melinda Douglas and Jim Lay were both members of 
the Judicial Selection Committee. 
222 Id. 
m See Carla Branch, Assembly Punts Nominees to Governar, THE CONNECI10N 
NEWSPAPERS, Mar. 10, 2004, 
http://www.connectionnewspapers.com/article.asp?archive=true&article=29796& 
paper=59&cat= 1 04. 
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pointed Dawkins while the General Assembly recessed, they might 
later decline to approve him for a full term.224 
While Judge Dawkins remains on the Juvenile and Domestic 
Relations Court in the 18th district,Judge Lisa Kemler, the runner-
up in the bar vote who accepted a temporary appointment by Gov-
ernor Warner inJune, 2004,225 was appointed to the circuit court by 
the General Assembly in January 2005.226 A number of Alexandria 
Bar members describe Judge Kemler's appointment to the Circuit 
Court bench as a "horse trade" in the General Assembly which put 
Connie Frogale on the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court in 
Alexandria.227 
V. CONCLUSION 
On February 19, 2003, the General Assembly filled twenty-five 
judicial vacancies without much controversy.228 Virginia Governor 
Mark R. Warner, a Democrat, criticized the Republicans in the leg-
islature, stating "[ilt sure did seem to me that the process was not 
the unbiased and impartial process that we'd like to see in our ju-
dicial reappointments.,,229 Most of the grilling of judicial candi-
dates about their political ideologies and past decision occurred in 
the House of Delegates.230 Despite encouragement from their col-
leagues to follow suit, for the most part, Republican state senators 
have declined to engage in such interrogation and instead consider 
only a candidate's qualifications.231 Some have even expressed con-
224 See Shear & Davis, supra note 213. . 
225 Chris L. Jenkins, Warner Makes New Pick far Circuit Court; Alexandria Judge With-
draws, WASH. POST, June 8, 2004, at BOL Judge Kemler had been a substitute 
judge before her appointment, and she received an "exceptionally qualified" rat-
ing from the Alexandria Bar Association. Id. In the bar vote, she was runner-up to 
Judge Dawkins in what was described by members of the Judicial Selection Com-
mittee as "a close vote." Id. 
226 Michael Lee Pope, Kemler Takes Seat on Circuit Court, ALEXANDRIA GAZETTE 
PACKET, Mar. 4, 2005, http://subvatican.com/gazette/kemler.html. 
227 See id.; Branch, supra note 223. Fragale was a candidate for the Juvenile Court 
bench in a field of ten candidates. Branch, supra note 223. She received a "quali-
fied" (one step above "unqualified"). Id. She did not win the bar vote; Barbara 
Beach, the only candidate who received a "highly qualified" rating, won the bar 
vote. Id. 
228 See Tyler Whitley, McClanahan to FiU Court Slot; Legislature Elects Judges. RICHMOND 
TIMES DISPATCH, Feb. 20, 2003, at A-6 (showing that although the court slots were 
filled, the Democrats attempt to re-elect Askew failed). 
229 Warren Fiske, For First Time, Warner Strongly Criticizes GOP; He Faults Abortion Bills, 
Questioning of Judge. VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Jan. 29, 2003, at AI. 
2'" Ginsberg & Shear, supra note 181. 
2>1 Id. 
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cern over the tactics employed by their counterparts in the House 
f I 232 o De egates. 
Due to the realities of the judicial appointment process in Vir-
ginia, ajudge's actions and ideologies may be the determining fac-
tor in his or her reappointment.233 Overall, politics do motivate the 
judicial selection and reappointment process in the Common-
wealth.234 The risks underlying reappointment cloud the virtues of 
the Canons. For instance, a judge seeking reappointment may opt 
to write opinions or reason according to a legislator's wishes, rely-
ing on that legislator'S vote in the General Assembly. The risk of 
losing the large retirement benefit makes judges less likely to take a 
politically unpopular path in his or her decision-making, even if 
that path represents the appropriate legal decision. As a result, in 
order to protect his job and secure reappointment, a judge will rule 
on a politically sensitive case under the guise of impartiality, but in 
reality, decide the issue according to the wishes of the majority 
party in the General Assembly.235 
Conversely, other judges follow the wisdom of the Canons236 
and Bar Association doctrines and make decisions counter to ma-
joritarian or legislative opinion by using fair and impartial adjudi-
cation. These judges' decisions are in stark contrast with the slew 
of conservative and ideologically based opinions issued in the Com-
monwealth and lead to a heightened scrutiny of the reasoning 
since they typically fall short of the conservative agenda.237 These 
decisions often cause alarm in the General Assembly because of the 
politically unpopular implications of "liberal" precedent.238 What 
this paper shows is that in Virginia, judges who care more about the 
impartial interpretation of the law, and less about the politics and 
2 .. [d. 
233 See Ashley Taylor, Judging the Judges-The Selection of a New State Supreme Court Justice 
Next Year Will Reveal Whether Vi7ginia Has Been Corrupted by the Politicization_of the 
Judicial-Approval Process in Washington, BACON'S REBELLION, Oct. 28, 2002, 
http://www.baconsrebellion.com/lssues/10-28-02/Judges_aTaylor.htm. 
234 See id. (stating that although the judicial selection process is "not as openly parti-
san and hostile as the process at the federal level, [it] is nevertheless an expression 
of political power"). 
235 This would be a case where a judge nearing the end of his term decided a case 
based on an obvious conservative agenda that was dearly poorly decided but the 
Assembly did not scrutinize the decision. 
236 "A judge shall not allow family, social, political or other relationships to influ-
ence the judge's judicial conduct or judgment. A judge shall not lend the prestige 
of judicial office to advance the private interests of the judge or others; nor shall a 
judge conveyor permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special 
eosition to influence thejudge." VA. SUP. CT. R. Pr. 6, § III, Canon 2(B) (1999). 
37 See generally Nuckols, supra note 151. 
2"" See id. 
2007] SEPARATE AND OBEDIENT 31 
financial risks of counter-majoritarian thought, face the reality of a 
litmus test for Virginia reappointments which oftentimes results in 
a loss of job security and judicial retirement benefits.2s9 
239 See id. 
